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ABSTRACT 
This study suggests a new decomposition of the effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on long-term growth in 
developing countries. It reveals that FDI not only have a positive direct effect on growth, but also increase the 
latter by reducing the recessionary effect resulting from a banking crisis. Even more, they reduce its occurrence. 
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I. Introduction 
How do FDI impact economic growth in developing countries? According to recent studies on 
the effects of financial globalization, the answer to this question is that the spill over benefits 
of FDI are more important than their direct advantages. In this vein, Okada (2013) shows a 
positive interaction effect between FDI and institutional quality on GDP. He concludes that FDI 
directly increase growth and indirectly enhance it by promoting institutional quality. 
Meanwhile, Neto and Veiga (2013) find the same result for the triplet FDI, technology and 
growth. On the other hand, Kunieda, Okada and Shibata (2014) highlight that financial 
development is one of the major spill over benefits of FDI on growth. The same conclusion is 
drawn by Ahmed (2016) and Trabelsi and Cherif (2017). In line with these investigations, 
Iamsiraroj (2016) presents empirical evidence concerning a spill over benefit of FDI on growth, 
which passes through the human capital quality channel. Regarding this literature, the main 
originality of this study is that it presents a new decomposition of the effect (direct and spill 
over) of FDI on growth, by considering their interaction with banking crisis, in 67 developing 
countries, among low and lower-middle income countries according to the World Bank 
classification, between 1972 and 2011.  
 
II. Methodology 
 
To decompose the effect of FDI on economic growth, we specify three models, namely two 
economic growth models (Equations (1) and (2)) and one banking crisis model (Equation (3)).  
GDPPCGit = 0 + γ GDPPC it-1 + 1 FDIit + 2CRISIS++ βX it+ µi +t + it                                                       (1) 
GDPPCGit = 0 + γ GDPPC it-1 + 1 FDIit + 2CRISIS+3 (FDIit x CRISIS) + βX it+ µi +t +it         (2) 
In Equations (1) and (2) above, GDPPCG represents the dependent variable, namely real GDP 
per capita growth. FDI is the first interest variables. It is measured by the total stocks of FDI 
assets and liabilities to GDP (FDIT) or the stocks of FDI liabilities to GDP (FDIL), extracted 
from the External Wealth of Nations Dataset. CRISIS is the second interest variable. It is taken 
from the Systemic Banking Crises Database (IMF, last update 2012). It equals “one” if there is 
a banking crisis in country i in year t, and “zero” otherwise. The control variables are GDPPC, 
which is the real GDP per capita lagged and X, which is a matrix regrouping the sum of exports 
and imports to GDP (TRADE); terms-of-trade growth (TERM); government spending to GDP 
(GOV); and secondary school enrolment (EDU). These variables are obtained from the World 
Bank Indicators database (WDI). 0 is a constant; µi is the country-specific effect; t is the 
time-specific effect; and it is the error term. Also, to estimate these growth models and deal 
with endogeneity bias (Roodman, 2009), we utilize the GMM system dynamic panel data 
estimator (Two-step system GMM) developed by Arellano and Boyer (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998), and we compute robust two-step standard errors by following the methodology 
proposed by Newey and Windmeijer (2009). In addition, we use the least square dummy 
variables estimator, the random-effects estimator and the one-step system GMM estimator to 
test the robustness of the Two-step system GMM results.  
 
CRISISit =F (Ω1FDIit + βZ it+0 + it )                                                                                                        (3)  
In Equation (3) above, CRISIS is explained by FDI variables and Z matrix, which represents 
the set of control variables. These are GDPPC, GOV, the GDP growth (GROWTH), the growth 
of money and quasi money to total reserves ratio (M2toRES), the growth of claims on private 
sector to GDP (CLAIM-PRIV), the domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) (CPRIVET) 
and the inflation rate (INF), extracted from WDI, as well as POLI, which is the indicator of 
political rights (1 = most free and 7 = least free) obtained from the Freedom House database. 
F(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Also, to estimate the banking crisis 
model and test the robustness of our results, we use three logit panel models (conditional fixed-
effects, random-effects and population-averaged).  
III. Results and interpretations 
Tables 1 and 2 below show that the coefficients of the variables FDIT and FDIL are significant 
and positive, and those of CRISIS are significant and negative in all regressions. This proves 
the positive direct effect of FDI on growth, and the negative direct effect of banking crisis on 
the latter. In addition, the coefficients of the interaction terms FDIT x CRISIS and FDIL x 
CRISIS are significant and positive in all regressions. This result indicates that FDI also allow 
a spill over (indirect) benefit on growth in developing countries. It consists of decreasing the 
recessionary effect resulting from a banking crisis. Besides, the outputs of Table 3 strongly 
consolidate this result. Indeed, the negativity and significance of the marginal effect of FDIT 
and FDIL on CRISIS in all regressions evidence that FDI are a negative determinant of banking 
crisis occurrence. In sum, theses direct and spill over advantages can be theoretically explained 
by two mechanisms. First, FDI reduce the negative effect of banking crises because they 
promote supervision and risk managing in the domestic financial markets through the presence 
of foreign investors, which indirectly oblige the local institutions to improve their governance’s 
quality under the fear of the “sudden stop”. Second, foreign investors inherence liquidity and 
technology transfer, which catalyse the domestic industry and foreign trade. The latter, as well 
as domestic investment, which increases through FDI due to their complementarity (crowding 
effect), are the main engines of growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Growth – Baseline and robustness estimations  
Estimator Two-step system GMM LSDV 
L.GDPPC -0.033 -0.033* -0.031 -0.031 -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.069*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
FDIT 0.049** 0.040**   0.041** 0.032*   
 (0.023) (0.020)   (0.018) (0.019)   
FDIL   0.050** 0.041**   0.042** 0.032* 
   (0.022) (0.019)   (0.018) (0.018) 
CRISIS -0.027** -0.042*** -0.027** -0.043*** -0.017** -0.027*** -0.017** -0.028*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
FDIT X CRISIS  0.113***    0.068**   
  (0.040)    (0.034)   
FDIL X CRISIS    0.122***    0.071** 
    (0.042)    (0.034) 
TRADE 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
EDU 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
TERM -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.010* 0.009 0.010* 0.009 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GOV -0.014 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant 0.037 0.034 0.038 0.033 0.295*** 0.295*** 0.295*** 0.295*** 
 (0.122) (0.105) (0.130) (0.111) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.101) 
         
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
R2     0.685 0.689 0.685 0.690 
AR2 P-value 0.178 0.139 0.186 0.138     
Hansen P-value 0.466 0.616 0.436 0.585     
Fisher     12.45 11.72 12.55 12.09 
Non-overlapping five-year data. Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient. Symbols *, ** and *** means significant at 10%, 5% and at 
1%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2. Growth – Other robustness estimations 
Estimator One-step system GMM Random-effects   
L.GDPPC -0.047** -0.046** -0.046** -0.044** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
FDIT 0.046** 0.034*   0.067*** 0.057***   
 (0.020) (0.020)   (0.015) (0.014)   
FDIL   0.051** 0.034*   0.067*** 0.056*** 
   (0.021) (0.018)   (0.015) (0.014) 
CRISIS -0.021* -0.032** -0.022* -0.032** -0.023** -0.034*** -0.023** -0.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) 
FDIT X CRISIS  0.082*    0.075**   
  (0.044)    (0.030)   
FDIL X CRISIS    0.093**    0.080*** 
    (0.045)    (0.030) 
TRADE 0.033** 0.036*** 0.029** 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
EDU 0.023** 0.024** 0.024** 0.024** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
TERM 0.028 0.022 0.029 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
GOV -0.017 -0.016 -0.018 -0.016 -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.054 0.043 0.049 0.041 0.048 
 (0.096) (0.102) (0.100) (0.100) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
AR2 P-value 0.166 0.100 0.166 0.132     
Hansen P-value 0.466 0.450 0.332 0.264     
R2     0.487 0.483 0.487 0.482 
Chi2-statistic     173.8 265.5 173.5 266.8 
Non-overlapping five-year data. Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient. Symbols *, ** and *** means significant at 10%, 5% and at 
1%, respectively. 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Crisis– Baseline and robustness estimations 
Estimator FE RE PA FE RE PA 
GROWTH -0.074*** -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.081*** -0.077*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) 
GDPPC -0.388 -0.122 -0.066 -0.346 -0.118 -0.065 
 (0.702) (0.313) (0.256) (0.705) (0.317) (0.254) 
CLAIM-PRIV -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
M2toRES -0.209 -0.213 -0.212 -0.221 -0.221 -0.216 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.183) (0.226) (0.226) (0.182) 
CPRIVET 0.616** 0.379 0.288 0.621** 0.388 0.293 
 (0.302) (0.242) (0.276) (0.303) (0.244) (0.278) 
GOV 0.132 -0.120 -0.074 0.157 -0.107 -0.069 
 (0.518) (0.409) (0.507) (0.521) (0.413) (0.509) 
INF 2.810*** 2.365*** 1.767*** 2.983*** 2.451*** 1.795*** 
 (0.850) (0.697) (0.494) (0.860) (0.724) (0.499) 
POLI 0.127 0.167* 0.174** 0.129 0.167* 0.174** 
 (0.101) (0.086) (0.087) (0.101) (0.086) (0.086) 
FDIL -1.743** -1.515** -1.187**    
 (0.709) (0.684) (0.492)    
FDIT    -2.329*** -1.957*** -1.564*** 
    (0.797) (0.758) (0.563) 
Constant  -15.115*** -11.914***  -15.579*** -12.046*** 
  (4.219) (2.964)  (4.365) (2.965) 
Observations 783 1,499 1,499 783 1,499 1,499 
Wald Test Statistic 44.69 38.67 51.75 47.40 39.59 52.52 
Log Likelihood -198.3 -291.3  -197 -290.3  
Likelihood Ratio Test 44.69 31.89  47.40 32.75  
Yearly data. Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient. Marginal effects and the coefficients of the constant are reported. Symbols *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
IV. Conclusions  
 
This study shows that FDI not only have a positive direct effect on long-term growth in 
developing countries, but also increase the latter by reducing the recessionary effect resulting 
from a banking crisis. Even more, they reduce its occurrence. Consequently, it is 
recommendable for policymakers in developing countries to dispel the “false evidence” that 
has emerged since the 2008 international financial turmoil, according to which financial 
integration is an absolute synonym of crises. 
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